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1 The first major problem related to the gaps in our existing factual knowledge of the Soviet organ. It seemed to me that this was one of the basic defects in our present intelligence system and I felt that its correction should be very high on our list of priorities. 28 January 1952, 7.2a

2 Attended luncheon and initial stages of discussion with O/RR industrial consultants. The discussion was extremely interesting, since the consultants emphasized the failure of NIEs to indicate the relative volume of facts on which various conclusions were based and also pointed out certain features in which NIEs were incomplete. I spoke to Mr. Dulles about this after the meeting and indicated that the consultants' views accorded entirely with my own, but that I was not entirely sure that O/NE in general fully appreciated the difficulty that everybody seemed to have with these estimates. 1 March 1952, 2

3 25X1A9a I attended a meeting in Mr. [REDACTED] office, at which [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of WSEG raised certain questions as to how best to prepare an intelligence estimate respecting the SAC plan. Dr. Millikan attended this meeting. After some discussion, I expressed the view that before this matter would be ready for the estimators, there appeared to be a Joint Task Force research project required. This might be similar in nature to the one that was headed up by Dr. Millikan in preparation for our conference with the [REDACTED]. It seemed to me to afford an opportunity to try out an operation which might be described as leading to the formation of an Intelligence Research Committee under the jurisdiction of IAC, to coordinate research required for national estimates. This Committee might even take under its wing such functional committees as EIC and SIC, but there were many problems that could not be broken down in functional terms and this one seemed to be of that type. At the conclusion of the meeting, [REDACTED] undertook to investigate certain questions with the SIC and get into contact with us within approximately one week. 4 March 1952, 6

4 Had an extended discussion with Messrs. Reber, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] respecting the coordination of factual studies in order to furnish more adequate support for national intelligence estimates. At the conclusion of these talks I determined that I shall require someone having the qualifications of [REDACTED] to spark-plug this program. 8 March 1952, 3

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5 Chatted briefly with Dr. Kent respecting the O/NE staff paper on IAC/JIC relationships and made the following points:

a. As respects the fact that IAC is the body to deal with national estimates, I felt there was no confusion in the mind of anybody on that point by now. Most of the trouble has arisen because JIC had not been properly advised as to the implications of the papers they were preparing.

b. There was a refinement overlooked in the O/NE paper, namely, that the JCS planners and others in the military establishment require papers containing much more details and facts than could possibly be included in a national intelligence estimate. Whereas the scope of a JIC paper may be identical with that of an NIE, the subject matter is distinguishable. That is why I suggested to Admiral Johnson that there might well be a combination of effort, rather than an attempt to draw a strict jurisdictional line.

Dr. Kent informed me that his office was preparing a staff paper recommending a subcommittee of IAC to coordinate matters of production. This committee would be chaired by DD/I, and have representation from O/NE and the other CIA production offices and also have representation from production offices of other agencies. I informed Dr. Kent of [REDACTED] suggestion of a similar body consisting of heads of planning within the respective agencies. Although we discussed this briefly, we reached no conclusions of any kind. Later informed Reber of these various activities, which are all related to his study of the same problem. 8 April 1952, 13

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6 Spoke briefly with Dr. Kent on the O/NE staff memorandum respecting authentication of facts. I said, in general, that I appreciated the quality of this paper and agreed with it in principle, insofar as it related to the activities of O/NE in preparing National Estimates. One minor point I raised was that sooner or later we would have to have pre mortems rather than post mortems. I took the position, however, that the CIA function of intelligence coordination was not confined to intelligence support for National Estimates and that on that aspect of the job I was not satisfied that O/NE had the answer. I indicated that these were preliminary views and I desired to give this question much more consideration. 16 April 1952, 9

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7 Inquired of [REDACTED] what had been done by O/NE respecting the request by the NSC Senior Staff to have certain outstanding factual estimates reviewed by the National Intelligence process. He informed me that an appropriate minute appeared in the records of the NSC Senior Staff and believed that the matter of Soviet air OB would be taken up in connection with NIEs 64 and 65. I indicated that there was no need for any further report if this belief were confirmed. 15 August 1952, 13

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8 Reviewed with Mr. Reber a program for planning, about which we are going to talk more at length later. 22 September 1952, 16

9 Mr. Becker briefly reviewed the DD/I organization noting that it now includes [redacted] but that DRC will revert to the operating Offices 25X1A2g 30 June. He explained that one of the goals of the DD/I concept is to assess our intelligence production and publications as a whole over and above the particular problems of the individual Offices. He advanced some initial reactions, such as: that our procedure for NIE's and the intelligence production within particular Offices is good, but that we have not yet worked out coordination of the production of intelligence as distinguished from production of individual publications. He added that we are making progress in establishing liaison with the policy agencies, including the NSC Senior Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
5 IAD 1 (11 March)

10 Mr. Becker raised the questions of whether the intelligence offices are doing all that can be done to support national intelligence and whether the offices are doing all they can to assist in planning. He suggested that a committee of Assistant Directors or a task force from their offices be constituted to suggest measures within the agency and in the intelligence community to meet these needs or to make a negative report if the needs are being met. He believes that this should be supported by an over-all appraisal of the total research resources available to the intelligence community. The Assistant Directors agreed to designate representatives to meet with the AD/IC on these problems and consider the following questions:

- a. Is any further co-ordination of research or support of national intelligence required?
- b. Is any additional planning of research for support of national intelligence required?
- c. If the answer to (b.) is yes, what should be done?

Mr. Becker also requested that each office furnish him with a list of the primary problems in which he personally or his staff could be helpful and asked that the AD/IC be kept continuously informed as to matters relating to the relationship of the offices to outside agencies.  
6 IAD 2 (1 April)

11 Following the O/SO briefing, the DD/I raised two matters for discussion:  

- a. the "personnel ceiling" matter, as approved by the DCI, 6 May;
- b. authentication of facts and related questions.

As to the latter, attention was called to the O/NE "Program of Estimates for the Remainder of 1952, "dated 5 May 1952. Mr. Becker undertook to circulate for comment a memorandum respecting the various staff studies on "facts," together with the available studies. The IAD's undertook to consider, as Office problems, the questions of auditing and planning intelligence production.

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The DD/I announced that members of the NSC Secretariat have emphasized the high quality of the intelligence contributions to NSC 135. This intelligence progress report was prepared on the basis of contributions from the IADs and IAC agencies. Mr. Becker requested that all those who participated in this exercise be commended.

It was brought out that study of the over-all intelligence progress report would highlight certain long-term primary problems. It was recognized that there would always be a sizeable number of daily "flaps," but that these primary problems demanded continuous study, and that at any given time the success with which they are met would determine our over-all intelligence position.

One such problem is that of intelligence production planning. The DD/I referred to the staff studies exchanged earlier in the year on this subject, and pointed out that he had purposely not written a memorandum to AD/NE on this subject, as promised, because of certain developments including the post-mortem technique, the NIE clean-up sessions and the deliberations of the ad hoc Committee on Scientific and Technical Intelligence. These had shown that many intelligence production problems are best attacked by an ad hoc approach. DD/I stated, however, that there remained certain problems on which progress could be best made by an officer freed of administrative duties and thus able to raise and devote thought to planning problems.

It was the sense of the meeting that the experience with NIE-64 has demonstrated that the proposed annual intelligence program is sound; in this connection, two commitments are outstanding, namely: the NSC has been told that the next such estimate will be timely for budget purposes; the R&DB has been informed that much of its needs will be met by our annual program. 16 IAD 1 (15 September)

1 Had an extended talk with Mr. Farley of the NSC Secretariat respecting intelligence support for NSC activities. Farley indicated to me the tentative plan of collecting a reference book for use by the President and we discussed informally the sources that might be called upon to furnish material for such a book. I explained to Farley the importance of the intelligence arrangements that had been made under the National Security Act of 1947 and had been implemented through the IAC. I emphasized the value of having national intelligence prepared upon a coordinated basis. Accordingly I felt it important to insure that any information within the competence of the IAC be obtained from the DCI, who acts as intelligence adviser to the President. We discussed briefly whether or not information respecting forces of Allies, such as the Nato countries, should be furnished by the DCI or by Defense. I indicated that I desired to discuss this question with the DCI and, indeed, that I desired to obtain his views upon the whole plan of activity upon which the Secretariat was engaged. I also indicated briefly to Farley the fact that I desired to strengthen and make somewhat more responsive to emergency requests the intelligence support that was presently being afforded NSC, particularly in the formulation of NSC papers in the NSC Senior Staff. With respect to this, I commented that at present there seemed to be a gap in that intelligence requirements for such NSC papers were not spelled out in enough detail to enable the intelligence mechanism to devote itself to the specific questions of fact with which the NSC Staff was concerned. Mr. Farley was extremely interested in this view and we both recognized the obvious connection between this matter and the problem of periodic reporting by the NSC Senior Staff which had earlier been raised by Mr. Farley in a discussion with Mr. Dulles and myself. At the conclusion of this meeting, I undertook to (1) have a talk with the DCI and advise Mr. Farley of his views on the several questions raised, and (2) ultimately give Mr. Farley an outline of how I thought the NSC papers could be coordinated with National Intelligence Estimates. I shall have to have ~~to have~~ an extended discussion with the DCI on the points raised at this meeting, probably in the evening. 16 January, 14

2 Respecting intelligence support for NSC, the Director indicated that he was willing to send a memorandum to [REDACTED] expressing the view that intelligence support for NSC papers should be in the form of a coordinated intelligence estimate and requesting assistance in defining the terms of reference for such answers as early as possible. 22 January, 13 c

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3 Another thing that concerned me was the lack of exact correlation between the policy decisions being made by the National Security Council and the intelligence prepared as a basis for such decisions. This was an extremely complicated question, but I had already initiated steps to see that the Intelligence Units were better informed as to what was likely to come before the Council and also to clarify the nature of the intelligence questions that would be asked, at the earliest possible moment. To some extent this would have to be done on an "eyes only" basis with the ADs, but I felt certain that they would be able to see that their working people had sufficient guidance. 28 January, 7. 2. b

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1 Adm. Stevens spoke to me concerning reports which he had received from PSB and others to the effect that State Department was not fulfilling its obligation to produce political intelligence needed by the operational units. He made it entirely plain that these were merely unsubstantiated rumors which he was calling to my attention for verification, rather than for any direct action at this time. Adm. Stevens further commented on the value of the report formerly put out monthly and now put out quarterly by the Moscow Embassy. Adm. Stevens felt that it would be most helpful to have these reports reinstated on a monthly basis. We also discussed the possible value of a State publication at some periodic interval containing a roundup of political intelligence, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union. Apparently State does not produce this type of material at present, and the DIPSUM does not fulfill this need. I may mention this need informally to Park Armstrong. In the meantime, we should survey the adequacy of political intelligence coverage by State from the point of view of CIA Offices and units. If this indicates that there is a serious gap in intelligence production in this field, proposals should be instituted to insure that State fulfills its responsibility and, if it is unable to do so, that some other allocation of primary responsibility is worked out. 9 May, 8

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2 Lunchd with [REDACTED] of PSB, at which time we discussed difficulties of obtaining adequate research and intelligence support for psychological and political warfare activities. 15 May, 7

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3 Asked [REDACTED] whether he would have any objection to my showing the Loomis study on social science research to [REDACTED], since I was taking some action to obtain better coordination in the intelligence field in this area. He had no objections. 4 June, 13

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4 Raised with Mr. Wisner my plan to consult Park Armstrong in order to raise the question of coordination of psychological and political intelligence. I outlined my view that this coordination might be accomplished through State leadership with CIA participation, but stated that I did not want to proceed with it until assured that it would be satisfactory to our Operational Offices, the intelligence support operations of which would be impinged upon. Mr. Wisner agreed to my proceeding as planned, subject to the understanding that it would be within the discretion of the Operational Offices to determine the line between intelligence research and operational information, a point with which I concur. 11 June, 10

5 Upon reading a memorandum from Mr. Reber indicating certain technical objections to a State request for assistance in connection with the organization of psychological warfare activities, I called Fisher Howe (in the absence of Park Armstrong) and indicated that we were sympathetic to a further development of State's resources in this connection and would seriously consider any request for assistance. I suggested, however, that Armstrong, Howe and myself have a discussion before any such letter was dispatched. Fisher indicated that they would know, within 15 or 20 days, whether State's request for additional funds for this purpose from Congress would be granted,

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4 Had a meeting with Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge to explore the possibility of a joint planners/IAC operation to estimate the situation in China, with specific reference to certain of [REDACTED] recent cables. Both Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge read over the [REDACTED] cables. After they had done so, I explained my reason for approaching them as follows: The possibility of liaison between planners and intelligence had long been under consideration. The Director had recently suggested to Gen. Bradley that some liaison be exchanged, but nothing had as yet resulted. It was my own feeling that when this suggestion was considered in the abstract, many fears and objections would be raised, but many of these would likely disappear in working upon a particular project. Under the circumstances, the China project (which was now entitled SIE 3) seemed to afford an excellent chance to try out a joint operation. Gen. Cabell commented briefly on the desirability of hitting this problem at its root. He believed that war-gaming should be left to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he fully appreciated that it would be most desirable to give "relativity" to estimates at the earliest possible stage so that they would be directed to the real questions that were under consideration by the planners and ultimately by the policy-makers. After some discussion, it was agreed that if SIC 3 were not in too advanced a state, CIA would have the terms of reference reviewed by the Joint Chiefs' planners (the channel to the planners being Gen. Partridge). During this review, the planners could indicate any additional questions they desired to have explored or might suggest certain assumptions which should be stated in the estimate. The mechanics and details were not as important as trying to bring the estimate more into line with the realities of the situation. I explained to Gen. Cabell that this procedure was almost exactly parallel to the one that had already been developed in dealing with the NSC Senior Staff Steering Group and that I felt certain that it would have a good prospect of success. 4 March, 2

5 Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge hand-carried to the Director the decision of the JCS making arrangements for liaison with the planners. Following our meeting with Gen. Smith, I met briefly with Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge and explained what I had in mind in organizing an IRC. Gen. Cabell, particularly, was in favor of such a development. 7 March, 14

Attended a meeting between the NSC Steering Group and the Board of National Estimates. The following points were brought out:

- 6
- a. Mr. Bohlen indicated that it would be most helpful to have estimates on the table during the discussion of the various policy papers and I undertook to have this done.
  - b. Mr. Noyes of Defense indicated that some indication of what had previously been covered would be most helpful. Dr. Kent stated that O/NE had prepared a card index of the substance matter of the National and Special Estimates which should be of value in this respect. Such index will be distributed to Steering Group members.

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- c. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that estimates tended to cover short-term periods, while policy papers were intended for a longer term. It would be most helpful if some of the estimates could cover longer terms so as to be parallel to the policy papers. We undertook to look into this question.
  - d. Various members of the Staff expressed interest in having more estimates covering the implications of various contemplated courses of action. It was pointed out that we would have to receive notice of what courses of action were contemplated in order to prepare such papers, but would be glad to do so if given adequate notice.
  - e. I emphasized the desirability of the Staff members themselves reviewing terms of reference and Mr. Bohlen emphasized the value to the Senior Staff of having drafts of estimates, prior to the final product, while they were considering a policy paper. We undertook to have such drafts distributed to them.
  - f. Various members of the Staff indicated the desirability, particularly on long-term papers, of alternate views and dissents by various IAC members, if that would tend to sharpen up the conclusions of the papers.
  - g. There was also a discussion as to the value of factual tabs, and it was agreed that such tabs would be extremely helpful on some, although not all, of the papers. It was felt that such tabs should not be distributed to certain consumers, but it would be of value to the Staff members to have them attached to the estimate.
  - h. Dr. Kent raised the question of the estimative language that had been worked out in some detail by O/NE and the reaction was mixed, although it was felt that the papers were considerably cleaner from the point of language than they had been. Mr. Lay seriously questioned whether or not the ultimate consumers could ever be educated as to the meaning of the estimative terms.
  - i. As respects the use of graphs and maps, the Staff members were unanimous as to their value.
  - 25X1A9a j. Mr. [REDACTED] ODM, indicated that it would be of value sometimes, when an estimate was based on a round-up of evidence made some time prior to the actual issuance of the estimate, to include a statement to the effect "This paper based upon data available to [REDACTED]."

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Following the meeting I spoke to [REDACTED] and requested him to insure that copies of all papers sent to Senior Staff members be sent simultaneously both to Mr. Dulles and myself, since we should at all times be advised as to what the various Senior Staff people were receiving. 10 April, 10

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7 Informed Mr. Armstrong that the Director would probably wish to comment on NSC 104/2 when it came before the NSC. Mr. Armstrong suggested that if a severe attack were made upon this progress report, an effort would probably be made to document its criticism of intelligence support. I explained that we fully appreciated this and later informed Mr. Amory that we might well have to write what in effect amounted to a reply brief on this subject. 7 May, 5

8 Mr. Gleason of the NSC Secretariat phoned and stated that after reading over our paper respecting intelligence support for economic activities, he obtained the impression that the policy agencies were seeking to use intelligence as a whipping post for failures of policy. I informed him that an express statement to that effect had been deleted from the original comment. Mr. Gleason indicated some concern at the coordination of economic warfare activities. I informed him that both Mr. Dulles and Mr. Wisner were well aware of this and were making representations to that effect, but there was a limit to which CIA could inject itself into the making and enforcement of policy. He said that he understood the point and indicated that he would press his suggestions with State. 5 June, 7

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in which event they would, at most, have to ask for interim aid from CIA. That was the primary reason they did not dispatch the letter in question. I suggested, nevertheless, that Armstrong, Howe and myself have a talk as soon as Mr. Armstrong returns to his office. 16 June, 8

6      Talked with Mr. Price, Deputy Director of R&DB, which has in mind a project for coordinating all research in Defense relating to Psychological Warfare. They have in mind requesting Max Millikan to serve on a part-time basis as the chairman of their panel. This choice seemed excellent to me. I outlined briefly to Price the fact that we were engaged in promoting coordination in this field, but felt that it would be most helpful to have an intra-Defense coordination established. It was my personal feeling that R&DB would be an excellent focal point for this activity. Price also informed me that McClure had requested R&DB to coordinate all Defense research relating to para-military activities. Here, again, I thought that intra-Defense coordination would be most helpful, but it, of course, would have to be coordinated with us. Millikan's acceptability to all sides would seem to make him an excellent choice. Later informed DD/P of all this. 1 July, 8

7      Mr. Nadel (Ext. 54741) of R&DB informed me that Dr. Millikan, although willing to serve as a panel member, should not act as chairman. This relates to R&DB's proposed panel to coordinate psychological warfare intelligence support within the Department of Defense. I indicated that I would seek other individuals to suggest and suggested, further, that R&DB consider some of the PSB staff members for this job. 17 July, 2

8      Had an extended talk with Fisher Howe, during which I recommended that State initiate action to survey and coordinate intelligence support for psychological operations, both overt and covert. Fisher indicated that they had given serious consideration to this question and were not prepared to take immediate action, in part on the theory that the present requirements are being met to the best of their ability and, in part, on the feeling that a large portion of the area to be coordinated lay within the control of operational organizations rather than in the intelligence community. I indicated to Mr. Howe that, in any event, Frank Wisner and I would have our needs surveyed and recommendations made as to how they could be satisfied. This might result in a substantial increase in Mr. Wisner's organic intelligence units, which would have to afford the type of detailed support which psychological operations require and which State was not presently set up to afford. Mr. Howe recognized a difference between this type of support and the psychological warfare research in which State was engaged in support of the Departmental programs and the National Intelligence effort. I indicated to Mr. Howe that we would consult with his office while making this survey and he designated Phil Trezise (Deputy to Allen Evans) as his representative on this subject. 18 August, 17

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- 9 In a discussion with Mr. Reber, indicated that I would like to see a draft paper recommending an inter-Agency study on intelligence support for psychological warfare. Gen. Balmer had now put this problem into the POC (Psychological Warfare coordinating committee) which was composed of representatives of the operators. I plan to attend the next meeting of that group in order to discuss this proposal. Later mentioned this to Mr. Dulles. 28 August, 15
- 10 Mr. Price, Deputy Director of R&DB, asked whether we had any reaction to a Mr. DeVinney as prospective chairman of their PW research panel. I was unable to find anyone in CIA who was able to give any reaction to Mr. DeVinney and so informed Mr. Price. 15 September, 1
- 11 Passed on to Mr. Price of R&DB the information I had received respecting Barnaby Keeney and assured him that CIA would welcome Keeney as a chairman of the proposed PW research panel. It might be most helpful to have a free-wheeler in that position. 16 September, 9

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- 1 Spoke to Mr. Reber respecting his report on discussions with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Office of DD/P respecting specific intelligence support for operations and suggested that he make it plain to the Office of DD/P that such requests should be brought to his attention so that any possible questions of priorities, etc. could be passed upon by the Office of DD/I. 19 January, 5

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- 2 Also Discussed with [REDACTED] the problem of disseminating sensitive intelligence items to operational units. I suggested that there was an obligation upon the Intelligence Offices to exercise some ingenuity in giving hints and other direction to operational units, so as to enable them to take advantage of intelligence without in any way revealing source. This, in my view, was a full-time operation and we would probably have to set up a unit to do it in each of the offices of origin, in which control over this type of dissemination should be vested. I felt that at present we were most deficient in this type of activity. The objective should be to train the operators not to ask for source information or intelligence (thereby acting as their own intelligence offices), but to afford them such intelligence service that they would not require the basic intelligence itself. 20 March, 13

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- 3 Called to the attention of Mr. Wisner and [REDACTED] of FE Division a Special Intelligence Digest item relating to Chengtu. Suggested to [REDACTED] and Mr. Sheldon that they establish some direct liaison in order to insure that such items are called to the attention of the Operational Offices. There is a good field for cross fertilization here. 23 July, 1

- 4 After talking with Mr. Sheldon respecting his investigation of the intelligence support afforded the Operational Offices, I raised with Mr. Wisner the question of organic intelligence units for Operational Offices. It seemed to me that it was not feasible to obtain adequate support for these Offices from other agencies, nor was CIA's normal organization to afford intelligence for the NSC adequate to Operational needs. I suggested that we have this situation surveyed and Mr. Wisner was in agreement. 24 July, 8

- 5 At the IADs' meeting announced the survey to be undertaken on behalf of DD/P and myself respecting the intelligence requirements of the Operational Offices. Also reported on my recent discussions with Fisher Howe and State's unwillingness to take any action in the field of intelligence support of psychological or other covert operations. 19 August, 15

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- 6 Spoke to Mr. [REDACTED] respecting the desirability of a study of the intelligence support requirements of the Operational Offices and my desire to use Mr. [REDACTED] on this study. Mr. [REDACTED] later suggested to me that Mr. [REDACTED] be added, so as not to take up too much of Mr. [REDACTED] time, and I agreed. 23 August, 4

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- 7 Attended meeting in Mr. Wisner's office with Messrs. Wisner, [REDACTED] At this meeting we initiated a joint survey to answer two basic questions, namely:

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- a. What are the intelligence support requirements of the Operational Offices, and how are they to be met, from within CIA or from outside agencies?
  - b. What are the intelligence-producing potentialities of the Operational Offices (particularly OPC type operations), and how can they best be made available to the Intelligence Offices of CIA, and ultimately for the remainder of the intelligence community?

25X1A9a It was agreed that a written directive would be premature at this time. I  
later spoke to [REDACTED] informing him of this survey. I suggested that he have  
25X1A9a [REDACTED] coordinate his thinking on overt collection with this survey. I so  
mentioned this survey to [REDACTED] and, at the Tuesday Deputies' meeting, to the  
DCI and to Mr. Dulles. 25 August, 525X1A9a

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Discussed with Mr. [REDACTED] the following:

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- a. Mr. [REDACTED] informed me that the information that I had previously received as to the source of the information contained in the Clark cable, which the Joint Staff had not sent to O/CI, was not entirely accurate. Nevertheless, it was felt that the Military did receive information from SO through Military channels and also delayed transmission of CIA's own messages until their authorities had received such material through Military channels.
- b. An attempt will be made to document the facts respecting the Clark cable.

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- c. Explored with Mr. [REDACTED] any concern which he may have had regarding the survey we are making of the intelligence requirements of the covert offices. It developed that Mr. [REDACTED] was not concerned as to the use of Mr. [REDACTED] or the fact of the survey, but had some views as to how it would be best to make available to the Operational Offices the fund of information available in O/CI. I indicated that this was the only one aspect of the problem that concerned me, since I felt the needs of the Operational Offices were much broader than any that could be fulfilled by O/CI.

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- d. Discussed briefly with Mr. [REDACTED] the personnel requirements we have for people trained in operational use of Special Intelligence and he suggested that I speak to [REDACTED]. I later made arrangements to do this. 6 September, 5

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9 Following the Deputies' meeting, sat down with Frank Wisner and [REDACTED] to review the situation respecting research support of psychological warfare operations by the Operational Offices. At this time I reviewed with Mr. Wisner my discussions with Fisher Howe, et al., last week and my views respecting the POC proposal. After some discussion, we agreed to recommend to the Director tomorrow morning that both Mr. Wisner and I attend the PSB on Thursday in connection with the proposed briefing on this subject. I had previously spoken to the Director, who indicated that he would accept my recommendation as to whether or not I should be present at that meeting. With respect to the POC activity, Mr. [REDACTED] explained his understanding which was that it called attention to the need of an over-all review of the total Soviet PW effort. On that I briefed Mr. Wisner and Mr. [REDACTED] on the proposed propaganda analysis unit being set up by George Carey and expressed the view that

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(such unit, as presently planned, would not be capable of taking on such a major research task. As to over-all evaluation of the Soviet PW effort, I raised the question as to whether such an estimate would be valid in vacuo. Our view was that the total activity would have to be taken account of and the PW effort would only be a portion of the whole. This tied in with the suggestion I had heard previously, (Cont'd) in which there was much good sense, to the effect that the Politburo itself was a psychological warfare mechanism. At the conclusion of this meeting, it was agreed that Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. Wisner would be briefed by their own people and then we could talk the situation over tomorrow. 8 September, 3

25X1C8d

25X1A9a

Mr. [REDACTED], Acting Chief Operations, DD/P, invited comments and questions from the IADs with respect to relations between the Overt and Covert Offices. It was the sense of the meeting that, in general, relations are good and are improving with certain difficulties still to be overcome. Among the latter, the following were mentioned:

- a. The Overt Offices would appreciate sanitized charts for distribution to the Division Chief level showing key covert titles, including initial designations, with telephone numbers. It would be helpful, although not necessary, if names could be supplied.
- b. It was pointed out that senior personnel of the DD/P complex reporting in to headquarters from the field invariably have intelligence information of interest to the DD/I Offices. Mr. [REDACTED] was requested to inform the DD/I as to the availability of such personnel for debriefing on matters of intelligence interest so that the Board of National Estimates and other interested Offices might be informed.
- c. Mr. Amory mentioned some cases of proselyting that had come to his attention; questions relating to the rotation aspects of the Career Service Plan were discussed.

25X1A9a Mr. [REDACTED] remarked the slow but steady growth of a point of view in the Covert Offices minimizing reluctance on the part of DD/P personnel to accede to proper approaches and requests, and encouraging contacts with Overt personnel, so long as such contacts are kept in recognized channels. The plan to loan an O/CI analyst to the covert cable organization so as to aide covert personnel in recognizing intelligence requirements was reviewed. Mr. Becker summarized recent conversations with representatives of the intelligence area of the Department of State in which State had been urged to initiate action to survey and coordinate intelligence support

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for psychological operations, both overt and covert. State has indicated that the problem has received serious consideration but that they were not prepared to take immediate action, in part on the theory that the present requirements are being met to the best of their ability and, in part, on the feeling that a large portion of the area to be coordinated lies within the control of operational organizations rather than in the intelligence community. As a result, it will be necessary to have the Agency's needs surveyed and recommendations made as to how they can be satisfied.

11 This is to be done jointly by a representative of the Operational Offices and a  
(Cont'd) representative of the Intelligence Offices. Such a survey might result in a substantial increase in DD/P organic intelligence units which would then afford a type of detailed support for psychological operations which State is not presently set up to afford. 14 IAD, 1

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25X1A9a

Requested Mr. [REDACTED] to ascertain from ONE and OCI their respective evaluations of the [REDACTED] cable covering his interview with Mossadeq and the latter's threat to deal with the Russians. 15 January, 16

Discussed with Mr. [REDACTED] of OCI his proposed visit to Dr. Kent of ONE 25X1A9a in order to offer assistance in the beginning stages of the estimating processes. I later discussed this subject with Dr. Kent and with Mr. [REDACTED] In all of 25X1A9a these discussions I made it plain that I felt it would be a great step forward for ONE to have additional assistance from OCI. Dr. Kent again raised a question as to whether OSI would give proper attention to NIEs. I indicated agreement with his position, which was that OCI should take account of the conclusions reached in NIEs and SEs, even though, upon occasion, he recognized that the OCI material might contain evidence inconsistent with such conclusions or might be supplemental thereto. I took this occasion to repeat the Director's statement that he recognized a distinct difference between the considered and coordinated estimates of ONE and the type of flash comment which it was necessary for OCI to make. I also brought Mr. [REDACTED] up to date on these discussions and the present understanding is that after Kent and [REDACTED] have had a talk, Kent will talk with [REDACTED] and his people. 16 January, 8

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

Later in the day I discussed both with the Director and with Sherman Kent (at separate meetings) the desirability of having both an annual plan for national estimates and an annual plan for IAC research. Under the aegis of IAC such a plan would not put upon CIA the onus of directing research on the part of the respective agencies, but it would afford a means of requiring each of the various agencies to assign a portion of their research strength to the presently neglected job of doing the research that is required to provide an adequate basis for national estimates. I suggested to the Director that the estimate relating to the SAC plan afforded an excellent test case to try out such an operation and he approved making the try. Both Dr. Kent and Dr. Millikan (with whom I later spoke on the same subject) were in hearty approval of the idea of an IRC, operating under IAC auspices. It will be necessary to assign to some individual the job of organizing such an operation. The man chosen should be comparable in qualifications and capabilities with [REDACTED] of O/RR, who shepherded the preparation for the [REDACTED] conference. 4 March, 7

25X1A9a

25X1X4

Mr. [REDACTED] informed me that O/CI was preparing an intelligence memorandum containing a round-up of the situation in South America and I undertook to mention to Sherman Kent the desirability of having such memoranda as a quick round-up, even though National Estimates would be prepared on the area some time in the future. Inasmuch as these IMs were being cleared with O/NE, and the procedure was operating very satisfactorily, I felt that there was little likelihood of conflict. 22 April, 8

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5  
25X6A Attended NSC Senior Staff Meeting which, in part, discussed the ONE estimates program. In connection with this discussion, Mr. Lay raised the question of whether the program for the latter part of this year took account of the necessity for the preparation of FY '54 programs under the NSC 1114 series, beginning in September. We indicated that we would review the adequacy of NIE's 64 and 65 for this purpose and would also insure that drafts of these NIE's, as prepared, went directly to the agencies which would soon begin advance preparations on this programming. Admiral Wooldridge also inquired as to the desirability of an estimate covering [REDACTED] as well as France and Italy. Dr. Kent explained the difficulties that had been encountered in preparing such an estimate previously, but indicated that the [REDACTED] would be covered in the planned survey of the strength of Western Europe, and this seemed to satisfy Admiral Wooldridge. 29 April, 11 25X6A

6 Also discussed with Mr. Sheldon the job of coordinating intelligence memoranda as between O/NE and O/CI and assured him that I would take no action on [REDACTED] memorandum before he had a chance to express fully all of his views. 24 July, 9 25X1A9a

25X1A9a Reported to the Director that the O/NE crash estimate was in the President's book. He indicated that O/NE was, perhaps, too preoccupied with getting out 25X1A9a coordinated estimates and was not sufficiently alert in preparing this type of crash estimate on fast-moving studies. Later I spoke with [REDACTED] and also with [REDACTED] as to how we could work out a joint arrangement for this type of paper. In my mind such a paper has a definite current intelligence aspect, since it should contain a brief current review of the situation to date. It also is an estimate, since it should forecast, at least on a short-range basis, the nature of coming events. The suggestion which appealed most to me was that the original paper be drafted, with due regard for existing tasks and priorities, by either O/CI or O/NE staff and that the final paper be approved by the Board of National Estimates augmented by AD/CI and appropriate representatives from O/CI's publication board. This procedure would be applied exclusively to memoranda for the Director, intended for transmittal to the White House. All parties indicated that they would study the question further and come up with some definite recommendations. 25 July, 4

8 Made arrangements with Messrs. Sheldon and Kent for O/NE-O/CI collaboration in preparation of the Director's briefing book for next Tuesday. 8 August, 6

25X1A9a Mr. Dulles commented on [REDACTED] suggestion of panels on various areas, representing the views of O/CI, O/NE, and the Operational Offices. I explained that we were accomplishing this at present on such areas as Iran, for example, but I would very much prefer to have such questions referred to me so that I would have the opportunity to organize an ad hoc group competent for the particular problem under consideration. In view of the range and complexity of the problems which arose, it would be impossible to form workable panels competent to handle all such questions. I emphasized the efforts that we are making to draw the operational people and the intelligence they possess into the stream of the evaluating processes. 21 August, 3

1  
Dr. Kent raised the question of who, in our Governmental structure, was authorized to make a Commander's estimate for the President. After some discussion, we concluded that no existing agency had been assigned this function and that it would probably require cooperation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, under the Act of 1947, are "military advisers to the President" and the DCI, who is in effect G-2 for the National Security Council. The difficulty is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no staff component capable of making such an estimate and, it should be noted, the number of officers on the Joint Staff is limited by statute to 200. Dr. Kent indicated that Gen. Partridge had expressed the view that a staff of approximately 100 officers would be required in order adequately to implement a suggestion of this nature. Dr. Kent and I resolved to take the question under continuing study. 26 August, 10

2  
I also spoke to Gen. Samford about the lack in our Governmental system of a mechanism for preparing a Commander's estimate for the President. Although the JCS might take a leading role in such a task, they were limited by law to a staff of 200 which was at present fully occupied with other duties. Moreover, the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence set-up should be brought into such a procedure. I was going to study the situation and might propose a directive, or even possibly supplementing legislation, and would very much desire any thoughts which Gen. Samford had on this subject. He agreed with the lack and also agreed with my feeling that there is at present too high a wall between Operations and Intelligence, a block which has to some extent been cut down in the Air Force. Gen. Samford undertook to take this matter under consideration. 28 August, 5

At the NSC Senior Staff meeting on Tuesday, Admiral Wooldridge indicated that he had discussed with General Cabell the desirability of some setup to obtain a Commander's estimate for the President. I made an appointment with General Cabell to discuss this informally on Thursday, at 2 P.M. 24 September, 9

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